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a b s t r a c t
Causality is one of the most fundamental notions of physics. It is therefore important
to be able to decide which statements about causality are correct in different models of
space–time. In this paper, we analyze the computational complexity of the corresponding
decision problems. In particular, we show that:
• for Minkowski space–time, the decision problem is as difficult as Tarski’s decision
problem for elementary geometry, while
• for a natural model of primordial space–time, the corresponding decision problem is of
the lowest possible complexity among all possible space–time models.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Formulation of the problem. Causality is one of themost fundamental notions of physics. It is usually described by a reflexive
binary relation a ≤ b meaning that an event a can influence an event b. It is important to study different properties of the
causality relation.
From the logical viewpoint, a natural way to describe such properties is to start with elementary statements of the type
a ≤ b, and to combine these statements by using propositional connectives∨ (‘‘or’’), & (‘‘and’’),¬ (‘‘not’’), and quantifiers ∀a
and ∃a over events. For each space–time model, i.e., for each set of events E with a given causality relation≤, the resulting
statements form a first-order theory of this causality relation≤.
We face two natural questions. The first is a fundamental question: is the corresponding first-order theory decidable?
In other words, is there an algorithm that, given a formula, decides whether this formula holds in the given space–time
model? For several reasonable space–timemodels, the corresponding theory is, in principle, decidable. For suchmodels, we
face a second more practical question: how difficult can this decision be? Or, in precise terms, what is the computational
complexity of the corresponding decision problem?
Our interest in this topic dates back to the 1970s’ paper co-authored by one of us with Grigoriev [15]. In that paper, we
were mainly interested in the first fundamental question: is the corresponding theory decidable? Since the 1970s, a lot of
work has been done about the computational complexity of different algorithms and problems, so we decided to revisit the
topic of that paper — this time from the computational complexity viewpoint.
What we plan to do. In this paper, we start with the simplest physical model of space–time — the Minkowski space–time.
From the fundamental viewpoint, the decision problem is solvable: we can use, e.g., Tarski’s decision procedure for formulas
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from elementary geometry (see descriptions below) — or, better yet, modern faster decision procedures for these formulas.
Our new (somewhat unexpected) result is that the decision problem for the first-order theory of causality for theMinkowski
space–time is as difficult as the general decision problem of elementary geometry.
We then analyze the general case of abstract space–timemodels, and we show that for every non-trivial space–time, the
decision problem is (at least) PSPACE-hard.
We then turn to another extreme — possible models of ‘‘primordial’’ space–time, i.e., space–time near the beginning
of the Universe. We provide some arguments that this space–time should be maximally symmetric, and we analyze the
computational complexity of the decision problem for causality theories in thismaximally symmetricmodel. For thismodel,
we describe an exponential-time decision procedure — arguably the fastest possible among different causality-related
decision procedures (unless it turns out that P=NP).
Finally, we provide arguments showing, crudely speaking, that there should not be any intermediate drastically different
space–time models: a natural transition from the primordial space–time should lead us to causality models similar to the
Minkowski one.
2. Case study: First-order causality theory for Minkowski space–time
What is Minkowski space–time? Reminder. Let us start with the simplest model of space–time — Minkowski space–time, a
4-dimensional space E = R4 with the causality relation
a = (a0, a1, a2, a3) ≤ b = (b0, b1, b2, b3)↔
a = b ∨ b0 − a0 ≥
√
(b1 − a1)2 + (b2 − a2)2 + (b3 − a3)2.
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Comment. In this formula, we assume that the units for measuring time and space are selected in such a way that the speed
of light c is equal to 1. If we use other units, then instead of b0 − a0 ≥ . . .we should write c · (b0 − a0) ≥ . . . .
Reduction to Tarski’s elementary geometry. The above causality relation can easily be described as a propositional
combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities:
(a0 = b0 & a1 = b1 & a2 = b2 & a3 = b3) ∨
(b0 > a0 & (b0 − a0)2 ≥ (b1 − a1)2 + (b2 − a2)2 + (b3 − a3)2).
Thus, all the formulas of the Minkowski causality first-order theory can be described in terms of the first-order theory of
real numbers, in which:
• objects are real numbers,
• elementary formulas are of the type x = y, x ≥ 0, x = y+ z, and x = y · z, and
• general formulas can be obtained by using propositional connectives and quantifiers.
In principle, we can also add more general elementary formulas of the type P ≥ Q , where P and Q are polynomials
with integer coefficients. However, this addition does not seriously change the expressive ability of this language. Indeed, if
we parse each polynomial, i.e., represent it as a sequence of elementary arithmetic operations, we can describe such more
complex formulas in terms of simpler ones. For example, computing x1 + x22 means that we first compute z1 = x2 · x2, and
then y as y = x1 + z1. Thus, the formula y = x1 + x22 can be reformulated as ∃z1 (z1 = x2 · x2 & y = x1 + z1).
In the late 1940s, A. Tarksi proved that there exists an algorithm which decides whether each formula from this first-
order theory of real numbers is decidable; see, e.g., [31]. He called this theory elementary geometry because if we represent
each point by its coordinates, then practically all the problems of elementary geometry can be described in this language.
Due to the reduction, Tarski’s procedure leads to a decision procedure for the first-order causality theory forMinkowski space–time.
Since first-order causality formulas can be described in terms of elementary geometry, the existence of Tarski’s algorithm
solves the first (fundamental) problem for the Minkowski space–time: namely, by using Tarski’s algorithm, we can decide
whether a given first-order causality formula is true or not.
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What is the computational complexity of this decision problem?. Tarksi’s original algorithm is very inefficient: its worst-case
time complexity grows faster than an exponential function 2n or than any iterations of this function, such as 2(2
n), 2
(
2(2
n)
)
,
etc.
However, later, much more efficient algorithms have been produced. This research started with the fundamental results
of Ben-Or, Kozen, and Reif [5] and Canny [9]. In particular, J. Canny showed that many problems are in PSPACE — which is
more efficient than EXPTIME in practice.
Collins and Hong [10] describe a general algorithm which requires only doubly exponential time∼ 2(2n). In Davenport
and Heintz [11], it was proven that the doubly exponential time is also a lower bound for the general quantifier elimination
problem, so exponential time is the worst-case complexity for elementary geometry.
Results from [5] and [9] were generalized by Renegar [27]. In particular, J. Renegar produced exponential-time decision
procedures for the case when we only have universal quantifiers.
Overall, the algorithms have been improved not only in terms of ‘‘theoretical’’ (asymptotic) complexity, but also in the
sense of practical implementations. These efficiency improvements have led to numerous practical applications ranging
from control to transportation to epidemiology; see, e.g., Ratchan [26] and references therein.
Since, as we have mentioned, for some subclasses of the class of all first-order formulas, there are faster algorithms, a
natural question appears: If we only restrict ourselves to causality-related formulas, can we have a more efficient decision
algorithm than in the general case?
Our first result. Our first result is that the complexity of the decision problem for causality formulas is exactly the same as
the complexity of decision problem for formulas of elementary geometry.
Specifically, we have already shown that there is a reduction from the first-order theory of Minkowski causality to
elementary geometry. This reduction requires time which is linear in the size of the original formula and increases the
size of the formula by a constant factor. It turns out that a similar reduction is possible in the other direction:
Proposition 1. There exists a linear-time reduction from the first-order theory of elementary geometry to the first-order theory
of Minkowski causality relation.
Conclusion. Thus, the computational complexity of the decision problem for first-order formulas of the Minkowski causality
relation is the same as for the elementary geometry. As a corollary, we can conclude that for the Minkowski causality, the
complexity of the decision problem is doubly exponential.
Related open question. As we have mentioned earlier, several fragments of the first-order theory of real numbers have
much faster decision procedures. In particular, Canny has shown that the entire existential fragment is in PSPACE — hence
much more efficient than EXPTIME in practice. It is desirable to find physically interesting classes of causality formulas that
correspond to such fragments — e.g., to the existential fragment.
Proof. 1◦. A theoretical possibility for this proof comes from the known fact that the Minkowski causality uniquely
determines a linear structure on the set of events. Moreover, every mapping R4 → R4 which preserves causality is a
superposition of Lorentz transformations, rotations, shifts, and dilations (homotheties). This was first proven by Alexandrov
[1,4] (see also Alexandrov [2,3] and Zeeman [33]).
Historical comment. The transformations described here are the conformal transformations. It has been well known for
a long time that these transformations leave the light cones invariant. It has also been known that the only smooth (=
differentiable) transformations which preserve causality are the above superpositions. However, the fact that the same
results hold for arbitrarymappings (without assumptions of smoothness or continuity) was only proven in 1950.
In [32], we have actually used Alexandrov’s results to provide a physical explanation for standard arithmetic operations
(addition, multiplication, etc.) on the number field.
We cannot directly use the above proofs because these proofs use sets, i.e., second-order objects which go beyond
the first-order descriptions. However, it turns out that the main ideas of these proofs can be modified into a first-order
construction. This will enable us to describe formulas of elementary geometry in causality terms.
Comment. In our proof, in addition to the original ideas from Alexandrov’s papers, we also use ideas proposed by Benz
[6,7], Lester [19–22], and Svozil [29,30].
Specifically, in our proof, in effect, we use the vector space structure on R4 and the fact that scalarmultiplication is defined
on it to encode addition and multiplication of real numbers.
2◦. A physically important part of the future cone a+ def= {b : a ≤ b} of a given event a is the boundary of this cone. From the
physical viewpoint, the future cone consists of all the events b which can be reached from a by transmissions with speed
c or less (where c is the speed of light). The boundary of this cone corresponds to events which can be reached only by
transmissions traveling exactly with the speed of light. Let us denote the fact that b is at the boundary of this cone by a≤˙b.
This relation is a particular case of the causality relation. It can be distinguished from the general causality relation by
the following facts:
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• when a≤˙b, then the interval {d : a ≤ d ≤ b} is linearly ordered:
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• when a ≤ b and ¬(a≤˙b), then the corresponding interval is not linearly ordered:
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Thus, we can describe the relation a≤˙b by an equivalent first-order causality formula:
a ≤ b&∀d∀e ((a ≤ d ≤ b& a ≤ e ≤ b)→ (d ≤ e ∨ e ≤ d)).
3◦. Let a≤˙b and a 6= b. A straight line which goes through the points a and b is called a null line because along this line, the
proper time√
(b0 − a0)2 − (b1 − a1)2 − (b2 − a2)2 − (b3 − a3)2
is equal to 0.
We can describe the fact that an event d ∈ R4 is on the same null line ab as the events a and b as follows: all three events
must be in ≤˙ relation to each other, i.e.,
(a≤˙d ∨ d≤˙a)& (b≤˙d ∨ d≤˙b).
Let us denote this formula by d ∈ ab.
4◦. Now, let a≤˙b and b 6= a. We can now describe what it means for a point d to be in a null hyper-plane — a tangent hyper-
plane to the cone a+ which passes through the line ab. Geometrically, this means that d is either on the line ab, or on no null
cone starting at any point e from the null line ab.
Indeed, any point on top of this tangent hyper-plane is covered by the boundary of e+ for some e, while points below this
hyper-plane are covered by the boundary of e− for some e.
In first-order terms, the condition that d is on this hyper-plane can be described as follows:
(∃e (e ∈ ab& (e≤˙d ∨ d≤˙e))→ d ∈ ab.
We will denote this condition by d ∈ H(ab).
5◦. In the 4-dimensional space, a null hyper-plane H(ab) is 3-dimensional (i.e., of co-dimension 1). Thus, the intersection of
two null hyper-planesH(ab) andH(ab′), with b′ 6∈ ab, is of dimension 2. Similarly, the intersection of three null hyper-planes
H(ab), H(ab′), and H(ab′′), with b′ 6∈ ab, b′′ 6∈ ab, and b′′ 6∈ ab′, is a straight line. Once can check that:
• this straight line is space-like (i.e., on this line, no two points are related by the causality relation), and
• an arbitrary space-like line can be thus obtained.
So, we can define space-like lines in first-order terms.
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Comment. If, instead of the 4-dimensional Minkowski space, we consider a space of a different dimension d ≥ 3, then we
need an intersection of d− 1 such hyper-planes.
6◦. Now, let us fix three events a, b, and b′ such that a≤˙b, a≤˙b′, and b′ 6∈ ab.
Since b′ 6∈ ab, these three points define a (2-dimensional) plane. A point e belongs to this plane if and only if there is a
space-like line which contains e and intersects with both null lines ab and ab′.
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This can be easily described in first-order terms, so we get a description of this plane. In the following reduction, we will
only use events from this plane. (So, all the formulas obtained after reduction should start with ∀a∀b∀b′.)
7◦. To get a reduction, we need to describe:
• real numbers,
• the relation≤ on real numbers, and
• two arithmetic operations with these real numbers:
. addition and
. multiplication.
Once we have that, any formula from the first-order theory of real numbers will be interpreted in causality terms.
8◦. Real numbers will be described by events from the line ab.
The event a represents 0, the event b represents 1, and an arbitrary number α ∈ R is represented by the corresponding
point b(α) def= a + α · (b − a) ∈ ab. In this representation, the standard order ≤ between the real numbers corresponds to
the causality relation between the corresponding events:
α ≤ β ↔ b(α) ≤ b(β).
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Because of this definition, every point d ∈ ab represents a number — the number α for which b(α) = d.
This number can be given a geometric interpretation if we formally introduce on R4 an Euclidean metric ρ in which the
distance between a and b is exactly 1: ρ(a, b) = 1. In this metric, the number α corresponding to the event d is simply equal
to the (signed) distance ρ(a, d) between the event d and the fixed point a.
9◦. To describe addition, wemust be able to shift ‘‘intervals’’ along the null line ab. This can be done as follows. By using two
parallel null lines and two parallel space-like lines, we can form parallelepipeds and thus, make sure that on a parallel null
line, we have an interval a′d′ which is of the same size as the original interval ad:
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Then, by using another parallelepiped, we can move the interval a′d′ back into the original null line ab, this time into a
different place, as a′′d′′:
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By using this construction, we can arbitrarily shift any interval along the null line ab.
10◦. Now, addition z = x+ x′ can be described as follows. In our representation, both real numbers x and x′ are represented
by points d ∈ ab and d′ ∈ ab for which ρ(a, d) = x and ρ(a, d′) = x′.
∗ ∗ ∗a
d
d′ 
x
 x′
By using a construction described in Part 9 of this proof, we then shift an interval ad′ onto the same null line ab in such a
way that the shifted interval de starts with the point d.
∗ ∗ ∗a
d
d′ ∗e x′  
x′
Since the length ρ(a, d) of the interval ad is equal to x and the length ρ(d, e) of the interval de on the same line ab is equal
to x′, the length ρ(a, e) of the combined interval ae is thus equal to x+ x′.
∗ ∗a
d
∗e x+ x′ 
x′
 
x
So, the event e is the desired representation for the sum x+ x′.
Comment. Strictly speaking, the above procedure only works for adding positive real numbers, so we need additional
constructions corresponding to different signs. The signs are easy to describe in first-order terms, since:
• non-negative numbers are represented by events d ≥ a, while
• non-positive numbers are represented by events d ≤ a.
11◦. To describe multiplication, we need:
• to have an alternative representation of real numbers, on the null line ab′, and
• to be able to move numbers between the original and the new (alternative) representations.
In the alternative representation, we represent real numbers by points from the null line ab′, with 0 represented by a, 1
represented by b′, and an arbitrary number α ∈ R by a point b′(α) def= a+ α · (b′ − a) ∈ ab′.
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If we have a point d ∈ ab (d 6= a) representing a real number, then we can describe the corresponding point d′ ∈ ab′
representing the same real number as follows: it is the only point d′ ∈ ab′ for which the space-like line dd′ is parallel to the
space-like line bb′ (since we restricted ourselves to the 2-dimensional plane, parallel simply means no common points).
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For an event b representing number 1, the corresponding point is a point b′, at a distance ρ0
def= ρ(a, b′). In general:
• If we have an event d ∈ ab which represents a number x = ρ(a, d), then in the alternative representation, this same
number is represented by an event d′ ∈ ab′ for which ρ(a, d′) = x · ρ0.
• Vice versa, an arbitrary event d′ ∈ ab′ represents a real number x = ρ(a, d
′)
ρ0
. In the original representation, this same
number is represented by an event d for which ρ(a, d) = x = ρ(a, d
′)
ρ0
.
12◦. We are now ready to show how multiplication can be described.
Similarly to addition, it is sufficient to describe multiplication of positive real numbers; other cases can be handled in
a similar manner. In the case of positive real numbers, we need to multiply two given real numbers x > 0 and x′ > 0.
According to our representation of real numbers,
• the value x is represented by an event d for which the distance ρ(a, d) is equal to x, and
• the value x′ is represented by an event d′ for which the distance ρ(a, d′) is equal to x′.
By using the construction from Part 11 of this proof, we can find an event d′′ ∈ ab′ which represents the same number x′ as
the event d′ ∈ ab.
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There exists a space-line line going through the points b and d′′. We then find a line which is parallel to bd′′ and which goes
through d. This line intersects with a null line ab′ at some point e′.
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Since the lines bd′′ and de′ are parallel, the triangles abd′ and ade′ are similar. Thus, we have the following relation between
the lengths of the corresponding sides:
ρ(a, e′)
ρ(a, d′′)
= ρ(a, d)
ρ(a, b)
.
By our choice of metric, ρ(a, b) = 1. By our choice of d as a representation of the value x, we have ρ(a, d) = x; so, the ratio
in the right-hand side is equal to x/1 = x. From ρ(a, e
′)
ρ(a, d′′)
= x, we conclude that ρ(a, e′) = x · ρ(a, d′).
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The event d′′ represents the value x′ in the alternative representation, so ρ(a, d′′) = x′ · ρ0. Thus, we conclude that
ρ(a, e′) = x · (x′ · ρ0) = (x · x′) · ρ0. By the definition of the alternative representation, this event represents a number
ρ(a, e′)
ρ0
= x · x′.
By applying to the event e′ ∈ ab′ the construction from Part 11, we get a point e ∈ ab which represents the same number
x · x′ in the original representation.
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13◦. Summarizing: we can represent real numbers, inequality between real numbers, addition, and multiplication. We thus
have the desired representation of the elementary geometry in the first-order theory ofMinkowski causality. The proposition
is proven. 
Comment. In our definition and in the proof, we mainly considered 4-dimensional space–time. However, one can easily
check that our proof applies to the Minkowski space–time model of an arbitrary dimension≥ 3.
3. General case
Discussion. In the previous section, we have shown that for the Minkowski space–time, the decision problem has double
exponential complexity. A natural question is: can this decision problem be much easier for other space–time models?
In this section, we will show that for every space–time model which is non-degenerate in some reasonable sense, the
decision problem of the corresponding causality theory is PSPACE-hard.
This means that (unless PSPACE=P), the decision problem always requires at least exponential time. In the following
section,wewill provide an example of a physically reasonable space–timemodel forwhich the exponential time is sufficient.
PSPACE: reminder for physicist readers. Themain result of this section is formulated in terms of the complexity class PSPACE.
This is a class which is very familiar to every computer scientist. However, our motivations come from physics, and we
therefore hope that some physicists will read this paper as well; for these readers, we provide a brief description of this
complexity class. Computer science readers can skip directly to the subsection titled ‘‘Our second result’’.
It is well known that some algorithms are practically useful, while some other algorithms are computationally useless:
even for reasonable size inputs, they require time which exceeds the number of particles in the Universe. This distinction is
very different to formalize. Usually:
• algorithms for which the computation time tA(x) is bounded by some polynomial P(n) of the length n = len(x) of the
input (e.g., linear-time, quadratic-time, etc.) are practically useful, while
• for practically useless algorithms, the computation time grows with the size of the input much faster than a polynomial.
In view of this empirical fact, in theoretical computer science, algorithms are usually considered feasible if their running
time is bounded by a polynomial of n. The class of problems which can be solved in polynomial time is usually denoted by
P; see, e.g., [24].
Not all practically useful problems can be solved in polynomial time. To describe such problems, researchers have defined
severalmore general classes of problems. One of themostwell known classes is the class NP. By definition, this class consists
of all the problems which can be solved in non-deterministic polynomial time — meaning that if we have a guess, we can
check, in polynomial time, whether this guess is a solution to our problem.
Most computer scientists believe that NP 6=P, i.e., that some problems from the class NP cannot be solved in polynomial
time. However, this inequality has not been proven, it is still an open problem. What is known is that some problems are
NP-hard, i.e., any problem from the class NP can be reduced to each of these problems in polynomial time. One of such NP-
hard problems is the problem SAT of propositional satisfiability: given a propositional formula F , i.e., a formula obtained
from Boolean (yes–no) variables x1, . . . , xn by using &, ∨, and ¬, check whether there exist values x1, . . . , xn which make
this formula true.
NP-hardness of SAT means that if NP6=P (i.e., if at least one problem from the class NP cannot be solved in polynomial
time), then SAT also cannot be solved in polynomial time. In other words, SAT is the hardest of the problems from this class.
It is known that all the problems from the class NP can be solved in exponential time. Indeed, for a problem of size n,
there are ≤ an possible guesses, where a is the size of the corresponding alphabet, so we can simply try all these guesses
one by one.
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This sequential testing requires only a polynomial amount of space. There is a larger class of problems PSPACE, the class
of all the problems which can be solved by using polynomially many computer cells. Problems from the class PSPACE can
also be solved in exponential time.
In the class PSPACE, there are also problems (called PSPACE-hard) to which all other problems from this class can be
reduced in polynomial time. So, if a problem is proven to be PSPACE-hard, this means that – unless PSPACE is equal to P (or
to some sub-exponential class) – we cannot solve this problem in less than exponential time.
One example of such PSPACE-hard problems is quantified satisfiability (QBF). In QBF, we consider formulas which are
obtained from the Boolean variables by using propositional connectives and quantifiers ∀x and ∃x over possible values of
the corresponding Boolean variables [24].
Our second result. In view of the above reminder, proving that a problem is PSPACE-hard means, in effect, that it cannot be
solved faster than in exponential time. The following simple result shows that for every non-trivial space–time model, the
causality decision problem is PSPACE-hard — and thus, in effect, cannot be solved faster than in exponential time.
As we have mentioned in the Introduction, we are only interested in the causality relation. Therefore, we arrive at the
following definition of a space–time model.
Definition 1. By a space–time model, we mean a pair (E,≤), where E is a set and≤ is a reflexive binary relation on E.
Definition 2. We call a space–time model non-trivial if there exist two events a and b for which a 6≤ b.
Comment. The only space–time models which we exclude are the ones for which a ≤ b for all a and b. For such models, the
decision problem is trivial.
Proposition 2. For every non-trivial space–time model (E,≤), the decision problem for the first-order causality theory of the
corresponding relation≤ is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. To prove that this causality-related problem is PSPACE-hard, we will reduce QBF (a known PSPACE-hard problem)
to this problem. By definition, the fact that QBF is PSPACE-hard means that every problem from the class PSPACE can be
reduced to QBF; since, as we will show, QBF can be reduced to the causality problem, this means that every problem from
the class PSPACE can be reduced to the causality problem — i.e., the causality problem is indeed PSPACE-hard.
In the desired reduction of QBF to the causality problem, we assign, to each Boolean variable xi, a pair of event-valued
variables ai and bi. In the formula F from QBF,
• each occurrence of the Boolean variable xi is then replaced with the formula ai ≤ bi,• propositional connectives remain intact, and
• each quantifier ∀xi is replaced with ∀ai∀bi, and each quantifier ∃xi is replaced with ∃ai∃bi.
For every space–time model, we can select bi = ai and get xi def= (ai ≤ bi) to be true. Since we assumed that the space–time
is non-trivial, there also exist values ai and bi for which ai 6≤ bi. Thus, each of the corresponding variables xi can take exactly
two possible values: ‘‘true’’ and ‘‘false’’.
So, the resulting formula of the causality theory is true if and only if the original formula from QBF was true. The
proposition is proven. 
4. Second case study: A reasonable model of primordial space–time
Main physical idea. In this section, we go to the other extreme: from theMinkowski space–timewhich reasonably describes
current space–time (at least locally), we go to the attempts to describe space–time near the beginning of the Universe.
Due to the high degree of symmetry observed today in the cosmic microwave background, cosmologists believe that
the early universe was homogeneous and isotropic; see, e.g., [23]. Several physicists have presented arguments that the
primordial space–time should have evenmore symmetries: that if we have a finite set of events a1, . . . , am, and in principle,
from the viewpoint of general causality theory, it is possible to have a new event awith a certain relation to ai (e.g., a ≤ a1,
a 6≤ a2, etc.), then such a ‘‘theoretically possible’’ event a actually exists in the primordial space–time; see, e.g., Droste [12].
Here, ‘‘theoretically possible’’ means that there exists another space–time model in which there are points a′i which are
related to each other in the same way as the points ai, and in which there is another point a′ with the desired relation to ai.
Similarly, if it is possible to have two events a and b related to ai and to each other in a certain way, then such events
must happen in the primordial space–time.
Let us describe this idea in precise terms. In this description, we will assume that the causal relation≤ is a partial order.
Definition 3.
• A 1-1 onto mapping f : S → S ′ between partially ordered sets is called an isomorphism if for every a, b ∈ S, we have
a ≤ b ↔ f (a) ≤ f (b).
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• We say that a partially ordered set (E,≤) is universal if for every finite subset S ⊆ E and for every finite partially ordered
set F ′, if S is isomorphic to a set S ′ ⊆ F ′, then this isomorphism can be extended to an isomorphism between the whole
set F ′ and some superset F ⊇ S of the set S.
Due to fundamental reasons dictated by considerations of quantum gravity, we assume that the space–time is countable;
this assumption, first made in Sorkin’s theory of causal sets [28], is used by Droste in [12].
Description of the resulting primordial space–time model. It is known (see, e.g., Fraissé [13,14] and Hodges [16]) that there
exists a countable universal partially ordered set. It is also known that all such sets are isomorphic, and that these sets have
large symmetry groups: every isomorphism f : S → S ′ between two subsets of E can be extended to an isomorphism of the
entire space E.
This means, in particular, that for every two events a, a′ ∈ E, there exists an isomorphism which maps a into a′, i.e., this
space–time model is homogeneous. This also means that if a1 < a2 and a′1 < a
′
2, then there exists an isomorphism of E
which maps a1 into a′1 and a2 into a
′
2, etc.
Comment. A similar universal construction for discrete space–time models has been described by Droste [12].
Computational complexity of the decision problem for the primordial space–time. In the previous section, we have proven that
for every non-trivial space–time model, the corresponding decision problem is PSPACE-hard, and we have mentioned that,
in effect, this means that we cannot solve this problem faster than in exponential time.
We have also shown that for a seemingly simple Minkowski space–time, the decision problem is much more difficult: it
requires doubly exponential time. Let us now show that for the (seemingly less trivial) primordial space–time, the decision
problem can be actually solved in exponential time — i.e., as fast as possible.
A possible explanation lies in the high symmetry of the primordial space–time: usually, symmetry helps in computations,
and here we have as much symmetry as potentially possible.
Proposition 3. There exist a polynomial P(n) and an O
(
P(n) · 2n2
)
time algorithm which, given a first-order causality formula
F0, decides whether this formula holds in the universal (primordial) space–time model.
Proof. 1◦. By definition, every formula from the first-order causality theory is obtained from the basic formulas of the type
a ≤ b by using propositional connectives and quantifiers. For each given formula F0, we can thus trace its construction to
the basic formulas and thus, get a sequence of (sub)formulas such that
• the first subformulas are elementary formulas of the type a ≤ b;
• each of the following subformulas is obtained from theprevious one(s) by using a propositional connective or a quantifier;
and
• at the end, we get the desired formula.
At the end, we get a closed formula (without free variables), i.e., a formula which can be true or false. On the intermediate
steps of this construction, however, we can have formulas like a ≤ b which contain free variables. Such formulas are true
or false depending on the values of these variables.
2◦. In our algorithm, to determine whether the final formula holds or not in the universal partially ordered set E, we will
follow the corresponding sequence of subformulas. We will show that for each of these subformulas F(a1, . . . , ak), its truth
in E depends only on the≤-relation between the values ai. Thus, all the information about the truth of each such subformula
for different elements a1, . . . , ak ∈ E, can be completely determined by listing all the (partial) orders on the k-element set
{a1, . . . , ak} for which this formula is true in E.
This listing can be equivalently described by a propositional formula of the type
((a1 ≤ a2)& (a2 6≤ a1)& . . .) ∨ (. . .) ∨ . . .
in which each conjunction (a1 ≤ a2)& (a2 6≤ a1)& . . . corresponds to one such partial order.
In our algorithm, we follow the construction of the formula F0 step by step, and along the way, construct the
corresponding lists for all the subformulas F .
• If the corresponding subformula F is closed, then we will simply generate the information on whether it is true or not in
the set E.
• If the subformula F(a1, . . . , ak) has free variables a1, . . . , ak, then we will construct a list of all partial orders on the
k-element set {a1, . . . , ak} for which this subformula is true in E.
At the end of this construction, when we get to the original closed formula, we will have its truth value.
Let us show how this works.
3◦. For the elementary formula a1 ≤ a2, we simply construct the set consisting of two partial orders:
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• an order in which a1 ≤ a2 and a2 6≤ a1; and
• an order in which a1 ≤ a2 and a2 ≤ a1.
4◦. Let us first consider the case when the next formula F(a1, . . . , ak) is the negation of the previous one: F(a1, . . . , ak)
def=
¬G(a1, . . . , ak). In this case, for the formula G(a1, . . . , ak)with k free variables for which we already have a list of all partial
orders on the set {a1, . . . , ak} for which this formula G is true in E.
We need to construct a similar list for the negation ¬G(a1, . . . , ak). For that, we simply generate all the possible partial
orders of the set {a1, . . . , ak} and then dismiss those from the given list (i.e., those for which G is true).
5◦. Before we explain how to proceed with other propositional formulas and quantifiers, let us describe the following
auxiliary operation.
In this auxiliary operation, we add a ‘‘dummy’’ variable ak+1 to the formula F(a1, . . . , ak). In other words, we simply add
this new variable to the list of variables, but the truth value of the formula F(a1, . . . , ak) is not affected by this new variable.
From the viewpoint of logic, adding a dummy variable is a trivial construction, because it does not change any truth
values. However, from the viewpoint of our proof, it is non-trivial:
• for the original formula, we have a list of all the partial orders on the k-element set {a1, . . . , ak}which satisfy the property
F(a1, . . . , ak);
• for the new formula with a dummy variable added, we need the list of all partial orders on the (k + 1)-element set
{a1, . . . , ak, ak+1}which satisfy the property F(a1, . . . , ak).
This new list can be constructed as follows:
• we consider all possible partial orders on the (k+ 1)-element set {a1, . . . , ak, ak+1};
• for each of these orders, we delete ak+1; if the resulting order on the k-element set is in the originally given list, we add
the corresponding order on the (k+ 1)-element set to the new list.
In this manner, we can add any number of such dummy variables.
6◦. Let us now describe how we can handle the case of a propositional connective F = G&H or F = G ∨ H .
We assume that we already have lists corresponding to the subformulas G and H , and we need to construct a new list
corresponding to the formula F .
First, if G has free variables which are not in H , then we add these variables to H as dummy variables. Similarly, if H has
free variables which are not in G, then we add these variables to G as dummy variables.
As a result, we can assume that the formulas G and H have the exact same set of variables. Then, we proceed as follows:
• The formula G&H is true for a partial order if and only if both formulas G and H are true. Thus, the list corresponding to
G&H is the intersection of the lists corresponding to G and H .
• Similarly, the formula G ∨ H is true for a partial order if and only if one of the formulas G and H are true. Thus, the list
corresponding to G ∨ H is the union of the lists corresponding to G and H .
7◦. To complete the description of our construction, we need to cover the quantifier case, when the subformula F(a1, . . . , ak)
has the form ∃ak+1 G(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1) or ∀ak+1 G(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1).
Due to de Morgan’s duality, the universal quantifier can be described in terms of the existential one:
∀ak+1 G(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1)↔ ¬∃ak+1 ¬G(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1).
Since we already know how to handle the negation, it is sufficient to describe the construction for the existential quantifier.
We assume that we already have a list of all the partial orders on the (k + 1)-element set {a1, . . . , ak, ak+1} for which
the property G(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1) is true in E.
As we have mentioned earlier, the existence of such a list means, in effect, that the formula G(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1) is
equivalent to a propositional formula G˜(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1) of the type
((a1 ≤ a2)& (a2 6≤ a1)& . . .) ∨ (. . .) ∨ . . .
which describes all the corresponding partial orders.
According to the above definition of the universal partially ordered set, if there is an element ak+1 with the desired
relation G˜(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1) in some partial ordered set, then such an element can be found in this universal set E as well.
Thus, the formula ∃ak+1 G˜(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1) holds for the elements (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ E if and only if there exists a partial
order on a (k+1)-element set {a1, . . . , ak, ak+1}which extends the given partial order on the set {a1, . . . , ak} and for which
the formula G˜(a1, . . . , ak) holds.
So, to construct the desired list for the formula ∃ak+1 G(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1), it is sufficient to consider all partial orders of
the (k+ 1)-order set {a1, . . . , ak, ak+1} from the G-list, and delete the element ak+1 from each of these orders.
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8◦. We have shown that the above construction indeed leads to the desired lists — hence, at the end, this construction leads
to the truth value of the original formula F0. To complete the proof, we must show that this algorithm indeed finishes its
computations in time O
(
P(n) · 2n2
)
for some polynomial P(n).
Indeed, for each subformula F , the most time-consuming part is the enumeration of all the partial orders on a k-
element set {a1, . . . , ak}. To describe each such partial order, we must know, for each pair (i, j) with i = 1, 2, . . . , k and
j = 1, 2, . . . , k, whether ai ≤ aj or not. There are k2 such pairs, sowe need k2 bits to describe an arbitrary order. Enumerating
all such orders thus requires as many steps as there are sequences with k2 bits, i.e., 2k
2
steps.
For each such sequence of bits, we also need to check whether the resulting relation is a partial order; this requires
polynomial number of steps, so overall, we need≤ p(k) · 2k2 steps for some polynomial p(k).
For our algorithm, the input is the formula F0 for which we want to know whether this formula holds or not. So, the
length n of the input is the length of the given formula F0. On each intermediate step, the number of variables k is bounded
by the length n of the formula: k ≤ n. Thus, the computational complexity of each subformula is bounded by p(n) · 2n2 .
The number of subformulas is also bounded by the length n of the input, so the overall computation time is bounded by
n · p(n) · 2n2 , where P(n) def= n · p(n) is a polynomial. The proposition is proven. 
5. Discussion: Is there anything in between?
Formulation of the problem. In the previous sections, we have analyzed two space–time models:
• the Minkowski space–time which (reasonably accurately) describes the current space–time, and
• the primordial space–timewhich seems to provide a reasonable description of the causality relation at the very beginning
of the Universe.
A natural question is: is there anything radically different in between?
In this short section, we will provide an argument that probably we should not expect anything drastically different.
Symmetry violation as a physically naturalway from the primordial space–time to the current (locallyMinkowski-like) one. From
the physical viewpoint, one of the important features of different physical processes is their symmetries.
We have already mentioned that the universal partially ordered set has a lot of symmetries. These symmetries can be
described in the following way.
Definition 4. Amapping f : M → M ′ between ordered sets is called a homomorphism if for every a, b ∈ M for which a ≤ b,
we have f (a) ≤ f (b).
Definition 5 ([17]). Let n > 0 be an integer. We say that an ordered set (M,≤) is n-structurally homogeneous if for every
isomorphism f : S → S ′ between two subsets S, S ′ ⊆ M with n or fewer elements, and for every m 6∈ S, there
exists an element m′ 6∈ S ′ such that a mapping f , extended to S ∪ {m} by setting f ′(m) = m′, is a homomorphism
f ′ : S ∪ {m} → S ′ ∪ {m′}.
The universal partially order set is n-structurally homogeneous for every n. Since our real space–time is different, this
means that these symmetries become violated, i.e., instead of n-homogeneity for all n, we only have structural homogeneity
for some n.
In [17], we have shown that, in effect, the standard axioms for causality as presented in Busemann [8], Kronheimer and
Penrose [18], and Pimenov [25], crudely speaking, correspond to 3-structural homogeneity.
Is there anything in between? To answer this question, let us first briefly summarize what we have just discussed.
• The primordial space–time is n-structurally homogeneous for all n.
• After a while, these symmetries are violated so that we only have n-structural homogeneity for some n.
• The current space–time corresponds to n = 3.
According to this logic, we can, in principle, have intermediate stages corresponding to n > 3, e.g., to n = 4, n = 5, etc. Let
us show that, in some reasonable sense, homogeneity for n = 4 implies homogeneity for all larger n. Thus, there is indeed
nothing drastically different in between.
To explain this result in precise terms, we first need to clarify our brief description of the main result from [17].
First clarification: we restrict ourselves to kinematic causality. The first clarification is related to the fact that in the definition
of a universal partial ordered set, we only considered countably many events. The justification for the possibility to restrict
ourselves to countably many events came from quantum gravity. In quantum mechanics, measurements are probabilistic.
In general, if we pick a kind of ‘‘random’’ dense set, then for each even a, the ‘‘probability’’ to pick another event exactly on
the boundary of the future cone of a is 0. So, in the general case, for this dense set, the boundary of each future cone is empty,
and the causality relation coincides with the interior of the future cone.
From the physical viewpoint, this interior corresponds to kinematic causality, i.e., causality via regular particles (which
can be at rest). Descriptions from [8,18,25] explicitly require this type of causality.
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Second clarification: we restrict ourselves to positive properties of causality. The properties which form n-structural
homogeneity mean that if some events a1, . . . , ak are related to each other in some reasonable way, then there exists a
new element awhich is related to these elements ai in a known way.
Each relation between the original events ai and aj and each relation between a new event a and the old events ai can
be either positive (i.e., of the type ai < aj) or negative (i.e., of the type ai 6< aj). In [17], it was shown that for the properties
formed from the positive relations, 3-structural homogeneity is indeed naturally equivalent to their standard formulation
in [8,18,25], while for negative properties, we had to add additional postulates.
Thus, it is reasonable to restrict ourselves only to positive relations, in which a causally follows some events ai and
causally precedes some other events bj. Of course, for this to be possible, we must make sure that every ‘‘lower bound’’ ai
causally precedes every ‘‘upper bound’’ bj. The resulting properties can be classified depending on howmany lower bounds
and howmany upper bounds we have. The property corresponding to ` lower bounds and u upper bounds will be described
as an (`, u)-property.
For example:
• a (1,1)-property means that if a1 < b1, then there exists an event a such that a1 < a < b1;• a (0,2)-property means that for every b1 and b2, there exists an event a such that a < b1 and a < b2; and• a (2,0)-property means that for every a1 and a2, there exists an event a such that a1 < 1 and a2 < a.
Let us describe this in precise terms.
Definition 6. Let l and u be given natural numbers. We say that a partially ordered set E has an (`, u)-property if for every
two tuples a1, . . . , a` and b1, . . . , bu for which ai < bj for all i and j, there exists an element a for which ai < a < bj for all i
and j.
Definition 7. Let n be a positive integer. We say that a partially ordered set E is positively n-homogeneous if it has the (`, u)-
property for all ` and u for which `+ u ≤ n.
Proposition 4. If a partially ordered set E is positively 4-homogeneous, then it is positively n-homogeneous for all integers n.
Proof. 1◦. Since E is positively 4-homogeneous, it has, in particular, the following three properties:
• it has the (0,2)-property, according to which for every b1 and b2, there exists an event a such that a < b1 and a < b2;• it has the (1,2)-property, according to which for every a1, b1, and b2 for which a1 < b1 and a1 < b2, there exists an a for
which a1 < a, a < b1, and a < b2; and• it has the (2,2)-property: for every four events a1, a2, b1, and b2 for which ai < bj for each i and j, there exists an a for
which ai < a < bj for all i and j.
Let us show that from these three properties, we can deduce an (`, u)-property for all possible natural numbers ` and u.
2◦. Let us first prove that for every ` ≤ 2, the (`, u)-property holds for all u.
To prove this property, we must show that if we have elements a1, . . . , a`, b1, . . . , bu for which ai < bj for all i and j,
then there exists an element a for which ai < a < bj for all i and j.
We will prove this by induction over u.
2.1◦. The induction base is straightforward: For u = 2, the existence of the desired element comes directly from the (0,2)-,
(1,2)-, and (2,2)-properties.
2.2◦. Let us prove the induction step. Let us assume that we have already proven the (`, u)-property; based on this, we will
prove the (`, u+ 1)-property.
Indeed, let a1, . . . , a`, b1, . . . , bu, bu+1 be any given elements for which ai < bj for all i and j. By the (`, u)-property, there
exists an element a′ for which ai < a′ for all i, and a′ < b1, a′ < b2, . . . , a′ < bu.
Now, for a1, . . . , a`, a′ and bu+1, we have ai < a′ and ai < bu+1. So, due to the (`, 2)-property, there exists an element a
for which ai < a, a < a′ and a < bu+1. Since a < a′ and a′ < bj for all j ≤ u, by transitivity, we conclude that a < bj for all
j ≤ u; we also know that a < bu+1. Thus, ai < a < bj for all i and j.
The induction step is proven, and so is the statement.
3◦. Now, for every u, we can use a similar induction – this time over ` – to prove that for every `, we have an (`, u)-property.
3.1◦. The induction base is straightforward: For ` ≤ 2, the existence of the desired element a was proven in Part 2 of this
proof.
3.2◦. Let us prove the induction step. Let us assume that we have already proven the (`, u)-property; based on this, we will
prove the (`+ 1, u)-property.
Indeed, let a1, . . . , a`, a`+1, b1, . . . , bu be any given elements for which ai < bj for all i and j. By the (`, u)-property, there
exists an element a′ for which a1 < a′, . . . , a` < a′ and a′ < bj for all j.
Now, for a′, a`+1, b1, . . . , bu, we have a′ < bi and a`+1 < bi. Thus, due to the (2, u)-property, there exists an element a
for which a′ < a, a`+1 < a, and a < bj for all j. Since a′ < a and ai < a′ for all i ≤ `, by transitivity, we conclude that ai < a
for all i ≤ `; we also know that a`+1 < a. Thus, ai < a < bj for all i and j.
The induction step is proven, and so is the statement. The proposition is proven. 
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6. Conclusions
Causality is one of the most fundamental notions of physics. It is therefore important to be able to decide which
statements about causality are correct in different models of space–time. In this paper, we analyze the computational
complexity of the corresponding decision problems.
We start this analysis by finding a relation between Tarski’s elementary theory of geometry and the first-order theory of
causality for Minkowski space–time. Due to this relation, the decision problem for Minkowski space–time is as difficult as
Tarski’s decision problem for elementary geometry, i.e., it
• requires at least exponential time, and
• can be solved in doubly exponential time.
We hope that the new relation between elementary geometry and causality theory will lead to even more efficient
decision algorithms for physically important classes of causality formulas. Indeed, M. Ben-Or, D. Kozen, J. Reif, J. Canny, and
J. Renegar have shown that many fragments of elementary geometry have a much faster decision procedure. In particular,
• the universal fragment has an exponential-time procedure (J. Renegar), and
• the entire existential fragment is in PSPACE (J. Canny) — hence, in practice, even more efficient than exponential time.
It is desirable to find physically interesting classes of causality formulas that correspond to such fragments, e.g., to the
existential fragment.
After analyzing Minkowski space–time,
• we show that for every non-trivial space–time model, the corresponding decision problem is PSPACE-hard, and
• we produce a reasonable model of primordial space–time for which the decision problem is in PSPACE.
In the final section, we provide arguments that from the viewpoint of computational complexity, a general space–time
should be similar either to Minkowski space–time or to the above primordial model.
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